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Williams: Arrests And Searches

LITIGATING SECTION 1983 FOURTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO ARRESTS AND

SEARCHES
John R. Williams*
Honorable George C. Pratt:
Our next segment here is on litigating Fourth Amendment
search and arrest claims. Our speaker is John Williams, a
dedicated plaintiff's attorney. John is the attorney who gives
municipal lawyers in the State of Connecticut fits. He has made
important case law and we are delighted to have him here.
John Williams:
One of the realities that every trial lawyer knows is, whether one
wins or loses a case has much more to do with the ability to make
one's own particular side of the case viscerally appealing.
Now that presents an interesting problem when talking about force
cases, where it is nice to discuss the "blood and gore and guts" and
so forth. These are the factors that appeal to juries, rather than
something a little more subtle like arrests, searches and seizures,
because clearly from the plaintiff's perspective, one has to find a
way to make these cases matter to juries.
The way to make simple arrest or search cases matter to juries,
without violence, is of course, to have the kinds of cases or the
kinds of clients the juries can identify with. Interestingly enough,
that often is more frequently the case in arrest or search cases than
it is in violence cases. The reason for that is that police officers are
ordinarily'somewhat less likely to assault people like your typical
Long Island jury, than they are in an arrest situation.
For example, take a case like Veiga v. McGee' from the First
Circuit in 1994. Here, the police arrested the passenger in an
* John Williams is a partner in the law firm of Williams, Polan & Pattis. He
specializes in the area of litigating Section 1983 Fourth Amendment challenges
to arrests and searches. He has also specialized in criminal defense work.
' 26 F.3d 1206 (1st Cir. 1994).
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automobile. 2 He was a medical student arrested for the crime of
not identifying himself when the police were in the process of
giving a ticket to a driver.' A jury can relate to a case like that.
Another example is the 1994, Tenth Circuit decision of Guffey v.
Wyatt, in Oklahoma. Apparently, people take basketball very
seriously in Oklahoma. A police officer was watching a game and
did not like the way the referee4 was making his calls, so he arrested
him for not calling more fouls.
The traditional Fourth Amendment5 law that has developed over
the last several decades is applicable in the Section 1983 context.
In fact, it may be more applicable than it is in criminal court
because the Fourth Amendment has been redefined almost to the
point of extinction in the criminal law context.
The Fourth Amendment retains its vitality in Section 1983 because
the exclusionary rule has become less and less a reality in people's
lives in the criminal context. It has become more of a reality in the
civil context.
This of course forces one to address questions like collateral
estoppel and Heck v. Hwnphrey6 issues, where, if one has taken a
hit from the court in the context of a criminal case, how can one,
nevertheless, have a viable Section 1983 case? The answer is, of
course, that a ruling at the trial level on a suppression motion has
no collateral estoppel effect at all unless it has been appealed.
2 Id. at

1208.
Id. (the officers testified that Veiga was "ranting and raving" and protesting
that the police had no right to ask him any questions).
" Id. at 870 (Officer Wyatt was hired to provide security at the basketball
game and believed that if the referee would keep more control over the game
he would be able to control the intense crowd).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but ,upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
6 997 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that an inmate's § 1983 claim was
stayed by the doctrine of equitable tolling, when it was dismissed for failure to
exhaust state remedies).
3
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If one had, in fact, ultimately a good result in the criminal case,
that is, losing a motion to suppress, but winning the criminal trial,
then there is no collateral estoppel effect whatsoever from that trial
judge's ruling. This is so because it could not be appealed.
However, the ability to appeal that ruling in most States is a key
component of collateral estoppel. The federal courts adopt state
law in formulating its collateral estoppel rules. So, one must
always look to state law in a particular district.
There are certain areas in Fourth Amendment law that are
particularly interesting, and exciting these days. One of these
issues comes up in the situation where probable cause exists at the
time the arrest is made, but somewhere along the line disappears.
This occurs because a police officer may acquire additional
information on the way to the station house or at some point in the
process, which when added into the picture, removes probable
cause. When that time arrives, a police officer has an obligation to
do something.
If the police officer does not do anything about that newly
acquired information, and the result is that a person remains in
custody or continues to be prosecuted beyond the point where he or
she should be, then that is actionable as a Fourth Amendment
violation. For example, Rogers v. Powell,7 in the Third Circuit last
year, involved a person who had been arrested with what
everybody agreed was probable cause.' However, the police
continued to hold that person at the scene of the arrest after having
acquired additional information that made it clear that the person
was innocent.9
Ultimately, in Powel, there was no formal arrest, but the
detention went on for a period of time longer than it should have.
That was held to be actionable by the Third Circuit in Rogers." In
120 F.3d 446 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Ild. at 451.
9 Id. at 452 (the arresting officers were informed that the prison could not
locate an outstanding warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest, however, they
were unclear as to whether as to whether an outstanding warrant or detainer
for Rogers' arrest existed).
'0 Id. at 456.
7
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other words, the old police expression "one cannot un-arrest
somebody" is not true. One can and one must.
Similarly, after the prosecution has been initiated by an
indictment, or through the filing of an information, and the case is
in court, a police officer who acquires exculpatory evidence of
innocence, has a duty to turn that evidence over to the prosecutor.
If the officer does not, and the result of the failure to do so is a
prosecution that continues beyond the point where it should have,
then attorneys fees would have run up beyond what they would
have been and incarceration would have run longer than it might
have.
This situation is actionable as a Fourth Amendment
violation.
Now, is incarceration necessary in an arrest context before there is
a Fourth Amendment issue? That often comes up in the case of a
written summons. This commonly occurs where an officer, instead
of taking the person in, simply issues a street summons, typically
for a minor crime like breach of the peace.
In the Ninth Circuit decision of Washington v. Lambert," the
Court held that when an individual is detained by police at gun
point and is forced to lie on the ground while being searched, this
individual has an actionable Fourth Amendment violation.
However, it will be actionable only if formal charges am not

brought. 12
An area of great interest to practitioners, in the Fourth
Amendment arrest context, is malicious prosecution. Malicious
prosecution is now well recognized as a separate cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment. This is supported by the United
States Supreme Court decision of Heck v. Humphrey."3 Currently,
all of the circuits recognize malicious prosecution as a valid cause
of action under the Fourth Amendment. This can be extremely
important for a couple of reasons. For example, there am cases
"98 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996).
2

Id. at 1194 (Judge Posner reasoned that it would be a sad day for the

United States if two African-American men who only somewhat resemble a
very general description of men suspected of robberies in the same general
area of a major metropolis can for that reason alone be subjected to the
terrifying and humiliating experience that Washington and Hicks endured).
" 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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such as Hygh v. Jacobs,1 4 which have held that the damages one
can get for a false arrest are cut off at the point where there is an
independent, intervening cause. s The independent, intervening
cause, typically, is the magistrate's finding of probable cause to go
forward, or a grand jury's turning of an indictment. If it is
malicious prosecution, malicious in that the officer makes false
claims that cause the prosecution to take place, then the damages
continue to accrue, because that is the result of what the officer has
done.
The typical situation, of course, is the Franks v. Delaware"6
situation, which has been widely applied in the cases of arrests and
cases of searches and seizures. 1 7 The other ireat advantage and
great interest in the malicious prosecution cause of action is the late
accruing statute of limitations. This has often been a lifesaver for
plaintiff's attorneys, and it is also something that is beloved by our
malpractice carriers. This is because many prosecutors, having
what they think is a bad arrest, will delay the case in court if they
cannot get a release.
Essentially, the courts that have constitutionalized malicious
prosecution under the Fourth Amendment have adopted all of the
common law rules, including the favorable termination rule.
A situation can become dangerous if the courts consider the
termination of a prosecution to be favorable in the sense that it is
necessary to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution.
That is a tricky question because here again the courts, in general,
look to state law. The laws of the states vary widely as to what is
or is not a favorable outcome.
For example, in New York State, the common law has developed
in a way that is very harsh. Under this development, not every
dismissal is considered a favorable termination. Now this has
created an interesting problem in the Second Circuit because the
14 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir. 1992).
15 Id. at 366.
16 438

U.S. 154 (1978).
The Court stated, "if the remaining content [of the search
warrant] is insufficient, the defendant is entitled under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, to his hearing. Whether he will prevail at that
hearing is, of course, another issue." Id.
17 Id. at 172.
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Second Circuit is so dominated by New York judges that they do
not notice the laws of other states. Connecticut law would be one
example. These Second Circuit judges have applied many aspects
of New York law to all of the states in the Second Circuit.
Nevertheless, as long as one is dealing with a straightforward
termination of prosecution for which there is no trade law, then
even in the Second Circuit that ordinarily is enough.
In the area of searches and seizures, it is not necessarily the case
that one has to win the underlying criminal case in order to have a
cause of action for illegal search and seizure. For example, one
could imagine a circumstance where evidence might be suppressed,
and yet, there is enough evidence left to convict. If the search is
nevertheless illegal, at least theoretically, there should be a cause of
action against the officers who perpetuated that illegal search and
seizure.
Of course, as a practical matter, lawyers know that a convicted
plaintiff is not a sympathetic plaintiff and so the reality of the
situation may be that one is not going to get very far with a case
like this. Instead, one is going to want to look long and hard at
those cases before deciding to take it on.
There was a theory that developed in the Second Circuit in Singer
v. Fulton County Sheriff." The theory focused on the next area of
discussion, loss of liberty. Singer stood for the proposition that if
one were to constitutionalize malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment, then there had to be a loss of liberty element
involved in order to do that. 9
For a brief period there were cases that suggested that when one
had simply a street summons, although that might support a false
arrest case, it would not support a malicious prosecution case
because that was not enough of a loss of liberty. However, the
courts now have come to understand that really is not so. The loss
of liberty involved in even the street summons is sufficient to bring
it up to Fourth Amendment standards. The Second Circuit
recognized this in Murphy v. Lynn, 20 which was decided in 1997.
18 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995).
19 Id at 117.
20 118 F.3d 938 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Murphy eliminated the loss of liberty element as one of the elements
be established in order to have a malicious prosecution
that must
1
case.

2

One of the elements that one must have for malicious prosecution
is malice, which is one of the traditional elements of common law.
How does one prove malice? Malice is ordinarily proved simply
by the absence of probable cause. So, if there is a lack of probable
cause, then one can assume that there exists a malicious prosecution
cause of action.
It is well-known that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Wilson v. Layne22 and Berger v. Hanlon,2 two cases which come
out on opposite sides in the reasonableness issue of bringing TV
crews into a household when a search is being conducted.
In the search context, the unreasonable search is the most
interesting from a plaintiffs point of view. The typical search of a
home will be executed with the assistance of a warrant. If one has
a search warrant the only time one is going to be able to have a
viable cause of action under the Fourth Amendment is if there is a
Franks v. Delaware' circumstance. But suppose that the search is

21

Id. at 947 (the court stated "In order to state a claim for the tort of

malicious prosecution under New York State law, a plaintiff must prove '(1)
the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2)

termination of the proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (3) lack of probable cause
for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as motivation for
defendant's actions.'" Id. (citing Russell v. Smith 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1995)).
= 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998). In Wdson, the plaintiffs brought a Section
1983 action against federal and state law enforcement officers. Plaintiffs
alleged constitutional violations stemming from the officers' entry into their
house in an attempt to arrest their son. The Court of Appeals held that

plaintiffs did not clearly establish their Fourth Amendment right to avoid an
unreasonable search and seizure resulting from the officers' allowance of

member of the media to record the execution of the arrest, without plaintiffs'
permission.
23 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
2 Franks, 438 U.S. at 156. ("[W]here defendant makes a substantial
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to finding of

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 [1999], Art. 19

1586

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol115

valid. If the search is valid, one may nevertheless have a good
cause of action based on the manner in which the search was
carried out.
The reasonableness of a search is always at issue when the police
are either in one's home or otherwise conducting a search.
Reasonableness is ultimately determined by the jury. However,
there are judges who want to substitute their judgment for the jury,
and many of them will get away with it.
Typically, the case a plaintiff's lawyer is going to want, is the
case where the police come in and they do not find anything
incriminating. The search itself may have been based on probable
cause, but they trashed the house or they abused the occupant.
There are cases which have addressed the searches of bars, or
other places of public accommodation, which may be conducted
pursuant to a warrant, however, everybody still gets detained. Can
that be done? There is authority that stands for the proposition that
even if there is a warrant that specifically authorizes the police to
detain or search everybody on the premises, then that is so plainly
invalid that even a qualified immunity defense would not apply.
The reason is because it is almost by definition a general warrant,
and general warrants have been prohibited since the colonial era.
Also, no one could reasonably think that it is legitimate to go in
with the purpose of searching one particular place and searching
everybody else who is involved. Similarly, these kinds of abuses of
people who are present on the premises are almost always
actionable.
A big problem for plaintiffs in that kind of case is getting past the
summary judgment motion. This is because too many judges have
had most of their experience in the Fourth Amendment area in the
context of criminal cases. These judges are used to denying the
motion to suppress and saying basically anything goes in the war on
drugs, or anything goes in the fight on crime. It is the lawyers' job
to educate the judiciary. Lawyers must educate through the use of
the language, as well as through the use of vivid examples of the
horrors that clients experience, as well as educating on a more
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the
defendant's request.").
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personal note. When these issues are personalized, it is easier for
people to relate to what is going on around them.
This became true watching the President of the United States
being subjected to grand jury abuse. Suddenly, the realities of
grand jury abuse came home to the people. That kind of theoretical
issue suddenly became real. The same can be true, and often is
true, in Fourth Amendment litigation.
In a Second Circuit decision called Goina v. City of New Haven,2
a fellow was arrested and prosecuted on a warrant charging
murder.26 After lengthy litigation, it developed that exculpatory
information known to the police had been omitted from the warrant
affidavit.27 The police did not lie in the affidavit, there were no
falsehoods, but they created a false impression by withholding
exculpatory information.'
The prosecution went on for many
years, and eventually the case was dismissed. 29 At that point, a
malicious prosecution issue arose, and a suit was filed under
Section 1983 on a Franks v. Delmvare claim.
In what way had Franks been violated? Franks had been violated
by the failure to include known exculpatory information in the
warrant affidavit. The Second Circuit has held that the omission of
exculpatory material from a warrant is a valid Fourth Amendment
cause of action." This is one of the very interesting and exciting
areas in which the law of search and seizure, as well as arrest, has
been going.
More and more cases arise where police, after learning the
lesson about the warrant requirement, acquire warrants in ways
that are not legitimate, honest or straightforward. Why does that
happen? Maybe it is because that is the way police officers are
trained.

2s 950 F.2d 864 (1991).
26Id.

at 866.

7

Id.at 867.
2Id.at 871.
BId.at 866.
2

' Id. at 871. "Intentional or reckless omissions of material information, like
false statements, may serve as the basis for a Franks challenge." Id.(citing
United States v. Campino, 890 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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There were a lot of cases in earlier years where courts have held
that police did not have to include all of the information in their
warrant applications, but that is no longer the law. Unfortunately,
some police officers think that it still is the law.
Also, qualified immunity has come to play a significant role in this
area, much to the dismay of those individuals who represent
plaintiffs. Some also hold the opinion that qualified immunity, in
the areas of both search and arrest, essentially is a reduced or
watered down version of probable cause. In other words, if
probable cause is held to be absent, then the qualified immunity
question becomes: could a reasonable, properly trained policeman
have thought that there was probable cause?
One of the interesting things is that in some circuits, the courts
have recognized the intellectual dishonesty of watering down
probable cause because, probable cause itself, as it has been defined
over the years, has an element of reasonableness built into it.
Further, in some circuits, with the exception of the Second Circuit,
if one has established the absence of probable cause then that seems
to be as far as one has to go.
It is important to remember that to the extent that one is dealing
with qualified immunity on a summary judgment motion, all one
has to do is have a genuine dispute of material fact and one is going
to get that case from the judge. Once that case goes to the jury all
of the means used by lawyers is essentially evaporated, and it is a
question of the jury doing the right thing, which is of course the
genius of the jury system in a democratic country.
Finally, Fourth Amendment cases are not as tough in the Section
1983 context as they are in criminal court. They have the ability to
appeal to the hearts of jurors rather than just to their minds. They
are cases that can be won and significant verdicts can be obtained.
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